FREEDOM FROM FEAR: PROSECUTING THE IRAQI REGIME
FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Weapons of mass destruction constitute the most serious threat to global security in the
twenty-first century. The danger of usage has become more extensive as third world nations
develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles beyond the control of
international treaties and bodies.1 Chemical weapons are particularly dangerous due to the ease
of development and use. 2 In the twentieth century, a few nations allegedly have used chemical
weapons--Italy in Ethiopia in 1935, and Egypt against Yemen in the 1960’s-- but the threat of the
use of chemical weapons was not fully recognized by the international community until Iraq’s
use both in Iran and against its own Kurdish population.3
The international community has never come together on punishing Iraq for its use of
chemical weapons for a variety of reasons, including, dependence on oil, lucrative commercial
ties and lack of common will.4 No individual country or global institution was willing to take
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action until Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which provided an unusual opportunity to demand
that Saddam Hussein surrender his weapons of mass destruction. The original terms of a
resolution between Iraq and the UN, called for Hussein to comply within a period expected to
last a matter of months, but Baghdad managed to stall the process for 12 years, despite the
worlds toughest economic sanctions, repeated diplomatic pressure and occasional aerial attack by
the United States and Britain.5 In the end, Hussein’s failure to comply led the Bush
administration in the post-September 11 environment, to force the world community to consider
punitive action. A coalition of forces, led primarily (and almost exclusively) by the United
States and Britain has embarked on Operation Iraqi Freedom with the goal of uprooting Saddam
Hussein and his regime and destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Several of the
leaders of the Iraqi regime are already in United States custody, but the fate of Saddam Hussein
has yet to be determined.
The prosecution of Hussein (if captured) and his regime for the use of chemical weapons
will set important precedent on several levels: for a post-war Iraq, the Middle East, rogue nations
and the world. As one of the most fragmented nations in the Middle East, Iraq faces the ongoing
danger of repressive tactics by the regime in Baghdad. Hussein used chemical weapons against
the Kurds to end their challenges to his rule. Prosecuting and punishing the Iraqi regime for its
use of chemical weapons will send a strong signal that the use of chemical weapons will not be
tolerated.
The Middle East has become the world’s most volatile region. Chemical weapon
proliferation has been intense in the Arab world and has also extended to Iran, Syria and Libya.
Containing the development and use of weapons of mass destruction is particularly important in
this region. Likewise, because rogue nations view chemical weapons as a quick way to obtain
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power, it is necessary to deter development and use. Prosecution of Hussein and his regime will
set an important precedent that any government that uses chemicals weapons, either domestically
or against another state, will be held accountable.
On a global level, since World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction has become a top priority of the international community. One of the goals of the
United States after World War II was to achieve a “freedom from fear” as described by President
Roosevelt as follows:
“In the future days which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded
upon four essential human freedoms…[t]he fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated
into world terms, means a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such
a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical
aggression against any neighbor-anywhere in the world…”6
The United Nations and various regional blocks have all worked on promoting
conventions, treaties, resolutions and laws, but the world has resisted taking any action against
any country in violation. Neither Italy nor Egypt faced any form of punitive action as a result of
their use of chemical weapons. Likewise, Iraq has yet to be punished for its prolonged and
massive use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. As a result of the important
precedent that it will set, and to finally achieve “freedom from fear,” it is essential to prosecute
Hussein and his regime for their use of chemical weapons.
This paper will introduce the Iraqi regime and explore its use of chemicals weapons
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. The effect of
the Iraqi regime’s use of chemical weapons against these individuals was debilitating and
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irreversible, and, in some instances, is just recently coming to light. This paper will also set forth
the relevant evidence that will be used in a prosecution of Hussein and his “most-w anted”
associates. A vast array of data has been collected over the past two decades by the United
States government, the United Nations and various non-governmental organizations which can
be used in a prosecution. The testimony of live witnesses who are still suffering from the effects
of chemical weapons is the most persuasive evidence of the use of chemical weapons. Next,
while it seems self-evident that the use of chemical weapons can be categorized as a crime, this
paper will discuss the various treaties and international laws which can be used as grounds for
prosecuting the Iraqi regime. In addition, this paper will discuss the available fora for such a
prosecution, both internationally and domestically. Finally, this paper will conclude by
reiterating that it is critical for the world community, in particular the United States, to prosecute
Hussein and his regime for the use of chemical weapons.
I.

Background
A.

The Targets: Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Regime

The targets of a prosecution of the Iraqi regime can be broken down into three separate
tiers, as advocated by the U.S. State Department.7 At the top tier is Saddam Hussein, the
president, prime minister and commander-in-chief of Iraq and his closest associates, the so called
“dirty dozen.” Hussein had the absolute power in Iraq, and was in power during the time of the
Iran-Iraq War and the Anfal campaign against the Kurds.8 His control of the military and all
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state institutions was beyond question.9 At the time of this writing, the United States is unable to
confirm whether Hussein has survived the most recent attack on Baghdad.10
The “dirty dozen” consists of Hussein’s relatives, two sons, three half brothers and a
cousin, as well as members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).11 Prior to Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the second “most-wanted” associate after Hussein was his cousin, Ali Hassan
Majid, also known as “Chemical Ali” for his role in the use of chemical weapons against Iran
and the Kurdish population of northern Iraq. 12 In March 1987, the RCC passed a decree giving
Chemical Ali unlimited powers to “preserve security and order and ensure stability.”13 Despite
the fact that Chemical Ali purportedly orchestrated the chemical attacks against the Kurds,
Hussein directed the war against the Kurds and was ultimately responsible for all of the acts
committed by those beneath him.14 Chemical Ali was reportedly killed in an air strike on his
home near Basra on April 4, 2003.15
Prosecuting Hussein’s top associates is imperative, particularly since Hussein may not
have survived Operation Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. Central Command recently created a new list
of the “Iraqi Top 55.”16 After Hussein, his two sons Qusay and Uday, whose whereabouts are
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also unknown, are second and third on the list.17 Qusay is Saddam Hussein’s younger son, and is
the Head of the Special Republican Guard and the Special Security Organization.18 Uday is
Saddam Hussein’s older son, and is believed to be particularly violent and unstable. He is the
head of the import-export ministries as well as the paramilitary enforcers.19 The United States
does have in custody, however, the eldest half-brother of Hussein, Barzan Hasan, who once was
in charge of the Iraqi intelligence service.20 Also in United States custody are former interior
minister Watban Ibrahim Hasan and top science adviser Amer Hammoundi al-Saadi, numbers 51
and 55, respectively, on the “Iraqi Top 55” list.21
As will be discussed below, there are a variety of fora available for trying this top level,
including the creation of an ad hoc tribunal or potentially the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”). However, U.S. ratification of the Rome Treaty establishing the ICC is unlikely under
the Bush administration and Iraq is likewise not a party to the Rome Treaty. A prosecution may
also take place by any domestic court which has universal jurisdiction for war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity. 22 The State Department’s current position, however, is a hybrid
court, which would take place in a liberated Iraq and would employ both Iraqi and foreign
judges.23
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Next, the 56 to 200 military and government officials who carried out the use of chemical
weapons against Iran and the Kurds should be prosecuted. The most likely forum for
prosecution of these individuals would be local courts in Iraq applying both national and
international law. Prosecution would take place after a new Iraqi government is stabilized, and
the new government would control such prosecution.
Finally, the thousands of Iraqi government officials and military personnel ordered to
develop and use chemicals weapons should also be subject to prosecution. Because of the sheer
numbers involved, it would be impossible to try every case. As a result, the State Department
advocates handling these individuals through a truth commission similar to that used in South
Africa, where amnesty would be granted in exchange for a full accounting of the crimes that
were committed.24 Regardless of what fora is eventually chosen, it is critical that Hussein and
his regime are brought to justice.
B.

The Acts: Saddam Hussein’s Use of Chemical Weapons
1.

Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War

Iraq used chemical weapons during its eight-year war with Iran.25 The chemical bombing
of the city of Susangerd in November 1980, at the beginning of the war, is the first documented
use of chemical weapons by Iraq.26 By February 16, 1984, Iraq had used chemical weapons
against Iran at least 49 times, killing at least 109 and injuring hundreds of others.27 But final
counts done by the CIA in 1991 estimate that Iran suffered 50,000 casualties, including
24
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thousands of deaths, from Iraq’s use of chemical weapons.28 But even this number may not tell
the whole story, as deferred symptoms from low-dose exposure have continued to plague the
civilian and military populations of Iran producing thousands of additional deaths.29
Iraq used chemical weapons to give it an advantage over the Iranian troops. Whatever
the stated purpose may be, the use of chemical weapons is an egregious violation of the law of
war.30 Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran was a key factor in Tehran’s decision to
agree to a UN ceasefire in 1988, as Iran’s medical personnel could not keep up with the
increasing chemical casualties.31
There are serious (and often delayed) health ramifications from exposure to chemical
weapons. Iraq used two primary chemicals during the Iran-Iraq War, mustard gas and the nerve
agent Tabun.32 Mustard gas has both liquid and dry forms and it emits a garlic-like smell.33 It is
particularly dangerous because of its ability to last for many hours, and even days. It burns any
body tissue that it touches, and can also result in blindness, blistering, skin discoloration and lung
damage.34 On the other hand, Tabun (nerve gas) works more rapidly then mustard gas.35 Even
a short exposure to the deadly agent can cause a running nose, sweating, involuntary urination
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and defecation, vomiting, twitching, convulsions, paralysis and unconsciousness.36 The use of
chemical weapons by Iraq was not limited to Iran, and the Iraqi regime continued to use these
weapons against its own people, the Kurds.
2.

Al-Anfal: The Campaign Against the Kurds

On February 23, 1988, Iraqi forces embarked upon a campaign of grave human rights
abuses which included the use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population in northern
Iraq.37 This brutal campaign was officially labeled by the Iraqi regime as “al-anfal” or “the
spoils.”38 Al-Anfal (hereinafter “Anfal”) is the name of the eighth revelation to the Prophet
Mohammad in the aftermath of the first battle encountered by the Muslim empire and refers to
the plunder of the infidels.39 The Iraqi government reportedly used this term as a means of
religious justification for the attack on the Kurds, despite the fact that the Kurds are also
Muslims.40 The attack against the Kurds was allegedly initiated because the Iraqi government
believed that the Kurds were united with Iran, with whom Iraq had been at war since 1983.41
Hussein directed the chemical attack on the Kurds, and his cousin, “Chemical Ali”
implemented the attacks.42 The attacks had many components, including mass disappearances of
36
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180,000 Kurds, mass summary executions and the whole-sale destruction of some 4,500 of the
5,000 Kurdish villages, to name a few. 43 The modus operandi of the Iraqi regime was to first
use chemical weapons, particularly mustard gas and the nerve agent Sarin. The goal was to
dismantle the Kurdish guerrillas, the peshmerga, 44 and cause them to retreat. The Iraqi regime
also used chemical weapons to send a message to the civilian population not to support the
peshmerga. The civilians were evicted from their homes so that they could be detained,
relocated and killed. 45 The physical effects of the chemical weapons on the Kurds were reported
as paralysis, trembling, shaking, difficulty swallowing and breathing, blindness and even death.46
The largest-scale chemical weapons attack against a civilian population in modern time,
occurred on March 16, 1988, in the town of Halabja. Some 5 ,000 civilians were killed in the
attack and an additional 10,000 were injured.47 But the attack at Halabja is just one example of
several attacks directed at the Kurds. Iraqi forces killed an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people

This is my intention, I want you to take serious note of it. As soon as we complete the deportations, we
will start attacking them everywhere according to a systematic military plan. Even their strong holds. In
our attacks, we will take back one third or one half of what is under their control. If we can try to take twothirds, then we will surround them in a small pocket and attack them with chemical weapons. I will not
attack them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for fifteen
days. . . .
Id. at Appendix A, The Ali Hassan Al-Majid Tapes 2. He has also been heard to have asked “Why should I let
them live there like donkeys who don’t know anything,” and also “I will smash their heads. These kind of dogs we
will crush their heads”, even further “Take good care of them? No, I will bury them with bulldozers.” HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ, supra note ___, at 8.
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during the eight stages of Anfal. 48 The Iran-Iraq War ended in August 1988 with a UN
orchestrated ceasefire, which also marked the end of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran
and the Kurds. In both countries, however, the effect of chemical weapons linger 15 years later.
Iraq’s repression of the Kurds in other ways also continues in 2003.49
II.

The Evidence: Saddam Hussein’s Use of Chemical Weapons
A.

Proof of Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons Against Iran
1.

Forensic Evidence: The UN Inspection Team

An international team of specialists was sent by the United Nations Secretary General to
Iran in 1984 to determine if chemical weapons had indeed been used by Iraq.50 The specialists
conclusively verified one of the chemical-warfare incidents reported by Iran at Hoor-ulHuzwizeh. The specialists identified the use during the Iran-Iraq War of two poisonous gasses:
mustard gas and the nerve-gas Tabun.51 At that time, however, The UN could not establish the
origin of such chemicals and whether Iraq had used them.52 The U.S. State Department
nevertheless issued a statement that “the U.S. Government has concluded that the available
evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons.”53 The UN Security Council also
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issued a statement condemning the use of chemical weapons.54 Investigators later connected the
use and production of chemical weapons to Iraq.55
2.

Testimonial Evidence: The Victims and Specialists

The most persuasive evidence of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran is
the testimony of the victims. These victims tell a sobering tale of the sights and smells of the
attacks and the debilitating physical effects of chemical weapons exposure. Iran is still
discovering more victims of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons even 15 years after the Iran-Iraq
War, and approximately 20% of the new cases are civilians who did not think they had been
exposed.56 One Iranian pulmonary specialist has estimated that a majority of the victims of
chemical weapons have not even been seen yet by medical specialists.57

Both the victims and

the Iranian medical specialists will provide compelling testimony at trial. Faced with this
overwhelming evidence, its has been reported that Iraq has indirectly admitted using chemical
weapons both during the Iran-Iraq War and against the Kurds.58
B.

Proof of Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons Against the Kurds

While the evidence set forth above regarding the use of chemical weapons against Iran is
compelling, stronger and more detailed evidence exists which proves that Iraq used chemical
weapons against the Kurds.
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1.

Forensic Evidence: Studies by NGO’s and Dr. Christine
Gosden

Investigators for Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human Rights conducted a study
of the medical effects of chemical weapons on the village of Birjinni in Kurdistan. Birjinni is a
microcosm of the many villages throughout Kurdistan what were attacked by chemical weapons.
A number of investigative techniques were used in the study, including interviews with
eyewitnesses, exhumation of victims bodies, archaeological research (including soil testing and
examination of bomb craters), and analysis the bomb canisters found at the village.59 The soil
samples were taken from bomb craters and were found to contain trace evidence of nerve gas,
Sarin and mustard gas.60 This was the first time that scientists were able to corroborate use of
chemical weapons with environmental residues still detected four years later.61 Based on their
analysis, the investigators firmly concluded that:
“the village of Birjinni [in Kurdistan] was attacked by chemical weapons on or about
August 25, 1988; that some or all of the craters investigated by the team archeologist
were made by chemical weapons bombs; and that the skeletal remains exhumed by the
forensic team were those of chemical weapons victims.”62
This finding was consistent with what the United States and the United Nations already believed:
that Iraq had used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, and that use extended to
Iraqi Kurdistan.
Dr. Christine M. Gosden, a professor of Medical Genetics at the University of Liverpool
in the United Kingdom has also conducted studies on the long-term effects of Iraq’s use of
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chemical weapons in Halabja.63 Dr. Gosden visited Iraqi Kurdistan in 1998 and examined more
than 700 patients who were exposed to chemical weapons. In recalling her experience in Halabja,
she stated that:
What I found was far worse than what I had suspected, devastating problems occurring
10 years after the attack. These chemicals seriously affected people’s eyes and respiratory
and neurological systems. Many became blind. Skin disorders which involve severe
scarring are frequent and may progress to skin cancer…[a]n increasing amount of
children are dying each year of leukemia and lymphomas. The cancers tend to occur in
much younger people in Halabja than elsewhere, and many people have aggressive
tumors, so that mortality rates are high. No chemotherapy or radiotherapy is available in
this region….64
Dr. Gosden also researched infertility, congenital malformations and infant mortality, and
found that there is a four times greater incidence of such effects in Halabja than in the
neighboring town of Suleymania.65 She also presented her finding to Congress on April 22,
1988 with the dual goal of drawing attention to the suffering in Iraqi Kurdistan as well as helping
the United States prepare for a future chemical weapons attack.66 Dr. Gosden will be a credible
expert witness for the prosecution on the fact that chemical weapons were used and the longterm effects of such use on the citizens of Halabja.
2.

Testimonial Evidence: Survivors and Medical Experts

The prosecution can use survivors, outside specialists and the medical experts listed
above to give testimony on the events and impact of the Anfal campaign. Human Rights Watch
conducted field interviews in Kurdistan and based on eyewitness testimony has compiled a list of
63
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known chemical attacks in Kurdistan from 1987-1988. Like the survivors of the attack on Iran,
these eyewitnesses will also provide persuasive evidence of the atrocities that occurred.
3.

Documentary Evidence: 5.5 Million Pages

The U.S. Government, in conjunction with human rights and Iraqi opposition groups has
collected 5.5 million pages of official Iraqi documents on the Anfal campaign.67 Generally,
these documents show the routine nature of the atrocities.68 One document from a security
director for the Iraqi regime to another security branch requests information on whether the
Iranians were providing the “saboteurs,” the Kurds, with anti-chemical protectives.69 This
document can be read as “undeniable proof” of the Iraqi regime’s genocide campaign against the
Kurds.70 Another document from the commander of military intelligence in Abril requests that
the various divisions count their stock of “Bio-Chemical Materials.”71 The U.S. State
Department has also stated that it has preserved videotapes of Iraqi war crimes that can be used
in an eventual prosecution.72
In sum, there is overwhelming evidence that Hussein and his regime used chemical
weapons against both the Iranians and the Kurds.
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III.

The Law: Prohibitions on the Use of Chemical Weapons
A.

The Development of the Law Prohibiting Chemical Weapons

The earliest statement on the prohibition of chemical weapons in an agreement between
the French and German armies in 1685. The parties agreed at that time “that no side should use
poisoned bullets.”73 Nations did not become dedicated to the regulation of chemical weapons
until the late 19th Century, however, when the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 banned the
use of poisoned projectiles or projectiles used to distribute poisonous gas.74 But the proscriptions
of the Hague Conference did not stop Germany from using chemical weapons during World War
I. So that it would not be in violation of the Hague Conferences, Germany filled canisters with
chlorine and let the wind blow the chemicals towards the French troops.75 France, England and
ultimately the United States treated Germany’s use of chemical weapons as a breach of the
Hague Conventions, and used chemical weapons in retaliation.76 Consequently, there were 1.3
million casualties in World War I from the use of chemical weapons, which led to the enactment
in 1925 of the of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (“Geneva Protocol”).77
The Geneva Protocol outlawed the use of chemical weapons against other states parties to
the Convention. The Protocol is not without its limitations, however. The Protocol does not
prohibit the development of chemical weapons or preclude stockpiling.78 Moreover, many
73
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countries reserved the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation against another country that
used them first.79 The imperfections in the Geneva Protocol were noted by the world community
when Italy used chemical weapons against Ethiopia in 1935.80 But in the years following this
use, stockpiling and development of chemical weapons continued and still continues today.
Although the United Nations was focused on the threat of nuclear weapons, it realized
that it needed to curb the development and stockpiling of chemical weapons.81 The United
Nations consequently created the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a multilateral
convention regarding chemical weapons.82 After more than a decade of negotiations, the
Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in 1993.83
On April 29, 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention was entered into force with over a
100 nations ratifying the Convention, including the United States, India, China, Russia and
Iran.84 The Chemical Weapons Convention is unlike the Geneva Protocol in that it prohibits all
uses of chemical weapons [not only during times of war] and also prohibits the production,
development and stockpiling of chemical weapons.85 The Convention also established the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which is charged with the task
of implementing, monitoring and enforcing the Convention. According to the Convention, the
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States Parties must report to the OPCW all of their chemical weapons, agents and precursor
chemicals, all of their actual production facilities weapons within 10 years of accession.86 The
OPCW is also allowed to conduct inspections, and upon a finding of non-compliance, it may
impose sanctions, but it is not allowed to use force.87 Despite its laudable goals, the Chemical
Weapons Convention has major shortcomings. For one, the Convention does not apply to those
countries who have not ratified it, nor does it apply to terrorist groups. Those countries of
international concern who have not signed the Convention include Iraq, North Korea and Libya.
The limitations of the Chemical Weapons Convention point to the fact that deterrence of both
stockpiling and use must be achieved in some other manner, i.e., through prosecution under other
existing international laws as discussed below.
The treaties on chemical weapons do not provide for the imposition of mandatory
sanctions against violators.88 The parties to these treaties can individually or collectively impose
sanctions but there is no universal mechanism of enforcement. 89 As a result, the United Nations,
specifically the UN Security Council must play a role in enforcing the prohibition on chemical
weapons. Iraq is a member of the United Nations and is required to abide by the UN Charter.
The United Nations Charter states that the peoples of the United Nations, reaffirm their faith “in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small.”90
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As a response to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, The United Nations
unanimously adopted Resolution 620 which condemned the “use of chemical weapons in the
conflict between Iran and Iraq.” 91 Resolution 620 was just one of a number of resolutions that
had been adopted by the United Nations relating to chemical weapons. A resolution by the
General Assembly in 1969 also prohibits during international armed conflict “(a) any chemical
agents or warfare-chemical substances, whether gaseous liquid or solid-which might be
employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants.”92
After the Gulf War, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 687 which also relates to
chemical weapons. Resolution 687 required Iraq to "unconditionally accept the destruction,
removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of. . . [a]ll chemical and
biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all
research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities."93 The preamble of Resolution 687
invokes the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention as the
justification for imposing this requirement.94 The destruction of these materials was to be
performed under the supervision of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which
was charged with the responsibility for inspection and investigation of all known or suspected
weapon sites.95 However, Baghdad has managed to stall this process, and to date, the United
States believes that Iraq is still in possession of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. Clearly, neither the various treaties regarding chemical weapons, nor the
91
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resolutions of the Security Council have succeeded in deterring and punishing chemical weapons
use.
Hussein and his regime may also be tried under the principles of Nuremburg. The
Nuremburg principles are applicable to the conduct of Iraq, because they were unanimously
adopted by a resolution of the United Nations (of which Iraq is a member state) and are also
considered to be customary international law. 96 Hussein and his regime may be tried for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The Nuremburg principles have recently been
used by the United Nations to bring war criminals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to
justice through the mechanism of an ad hoc tribunal. A similar ad hoc tribunal could be
established with respect to Iraq. In addition, The Rome Treaty for the establishment of the
International Criminal Court also makes “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
all analogous liquids or devices” a war crime.97
Based on the above, the prosecution will have an arsenal of international treaties, laws
and regulations at its disposal under which to prosecute Hussein and his regime for the use of
chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and against the Kurds. International law distinguishes,
however, between using chemical weapons in against another country and using chemical
weapons against a country’s own people.98 As a result of this difference, the treaties and laws
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applicable to the use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds will be discussed
separately.
B.

Violations of International Law for the Use of Chemical Weapons Against
Iran

The use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran is a violation of several of the
international laws and resolutions discussed above. Despite the unavailability of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, there are other avenues by which Hussein and his regime could be held
liable for the use of chemical weapons against Iran.
First, Iraq could be tried for a violation of the Geneva Protocol.99 Iraq ratified the
Geneva Protocol on September 8, 1931.100 The Geneva Protocol states:
“The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analgous liquids,
materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised
world; and…That the High Contracting Parties…accept this prohibition, agree to extend
this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound
between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.”101
The fact that Iraq violated the Geneva Protocol with its use of chemical weapons during the IranIraq War was acknowledged by the UN Security Council on March 21, 1986 when it criticized
Iraq for “use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.”102
Second, Iraq has also violated the Additional Protocol of August 12, 1949, on the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter “Protocol I”) which states in
Article 35(2) that:
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“it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”103
Third, Iraq is a member of the United Nations and is required to abide by the United
Nations Charter as well as the various security council resolution prohibiting the use and
stockpiling of chemical weapons.
Fourth, the actions of the Iraqi regime constitute a war crime and a crime against
humanity as defined by the Nuremburg principles. According to Article 6(b) of the Nuremburg
judgment, a war crime is defined as follows:
namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but are
not limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property,
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity.104
Undoubtedly, Iraq’s conduct in using chemical weapons against the civilian population in Iran
would constitute “murder” or “ill-treatment” and a count for war crimes could be included in a
charge against Hussein and his regime.
The use of chemical weapons against Iran is also a crime against humanity. A crime
against humanity is defined in the Nuremburg principles as:
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated.105
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Based on this definition, Hussein and his regime could also be prosecuted for crimes against
humanity.
C.

Violations of International Law for the Use of Chemical Weapons Against the
Kurds.
Although the Kurdish population in northern Iraq may not be protected by the Geneva

Convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, the Kurds are still protected by
international law. First and foremost, there is a compelling argument that the use of chemical
weapons against the Kurds was genocide. The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such (a) killing the members of the group;
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part; (d) imposing measure intending to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.106
According to Human Rights Watch and other legal commentators it is evident that the aim of the
Iraqi regime was to destroy the Iraqi Kurds (in part) and it had done so.107 Further, Human
Rights Watch has reported that “intent and act had been combined, resulting in the consummated
crime of genocide.”108 In 1995, the United States finally agreed with Human Rights Watch that
the action taken by Hussein against the Kurds was genocide.109 Prior to that time, there were
many arguments that Iraq had not committed genocide, simply because to many diplomats “it
106
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didn’t look like the Holocaust.”110 However, once these diplomats had the opportunity to review
the language of the Genocide Convention, they recognized that Hussein’s conduct met the
definition of genocide.111
In addition to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are also applicable to
the Iraqi regime’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurds for the same reasons discussed as
to the use against Iran. Thus, a prosecutor could recite a litany of crimes in a charge brought
against Hussein and his regime.
IV.

The Fora: International and Domestic Prosecution Options

Now that it is clear that the evidence and laws exist for the prosecution of Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi regime for the use of chemical weapons, the next question is where such
prosecution should take place.112 As mentioned above, there are a variety of options for
prosecution both internationally and domestically, which will be discussed below.
There are a number of considerations that go into the decision of where to prosecute.
Accountability is key to the development of a strong legal system in post-war Iraq. At the same
time, prosecuting Hussein and the Iraqi regime on Iraqi soil may keep Iraqi citizens stuck in the
past rather than moving towards the future. A combination of prosecution options may also be
imposed. For example, it may be prudent to try the top tier of the Iraqi regime through an
international tribunal, while instituting a truth commission for the lower-level government
officials who participated in the atrocities at the direction of others. Another key question is
who is to make this decision—the United States, who has custody of some of the leaders of the
110
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Iraqi regime, the United Nations who has the authority to establish an ad hoc tribunal, the people
of Iraq? While there is no clear answer to this question, it is preferable that the UN, as a
representative of the world community make this decision.
A.

International Prosecution Options
1.

Creation of an Ad Hoc Tribunal: The International Criminal
Tribunal for Iraq (ICTI)

The most obvious forum for the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime
would be the creation by the United Nations of an ad hoc tribunal, such as those established for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). The ICTY and ICTR were established by
the Security Council through the use of their power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The
tribunals could have been established through a multilateral convention forwarded to the UN
General Assembly for adoption by the member states.113 However, at the time of the creation of
the ICTY and ICTR it was not likely that a consensus would have been reached on their
establishment because it would have been viewed as a step towards the adoption of the
International Criminal Court.114 It is also unlikely that the General Assembly would agree to
establish such a tribunal with respect to Iraq. Indeed, one commentator has stated that it would
take a “Herculean” effort to persuade even the Security Council to agree to an Iraqi Tribunal,
especially in light of the opposition within the Security Council to the United States’ policy on
war with Iraq. 115
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The United States has already contributed $4 million to a U.N. War Crimes Commission
which would be used if a UN Tribunal for Iraqi war crimes was created.116 One of the problems
with the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal is financial viability. As learned through the
experiences with ICTY and ICTR, the operation of an ad hoc tribunal is expensive. For example,
both the ICTY and ICTR both get $100 million annually from the UN treasury.117 In light of the
expenses that will undoubtedly occur in rebuilding Iraq, as well as the continuation of the work
of the two current tribunals, it is questionable whether the UN will want to devote its resources to
the funding of another ad hoc tribunal.
There are considerable benefits to the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal, however. For
one, it demonstrates that the world community is united in its efforts to prosecute Hussein and
the Iraqi regime for their use of chemical weapons and other war crimes. Moreover, an ad hoc
tribunal provides a set of rules to be followed, consolidates resources and works to ensure that
there is some consistency among prosecutions. An ad hoc tribunal also establishes a body of
criminal jurisprudence that is important to the international community as a whole.118
Along the same lines, an occupation court like the one established for Nuremburg and
Tokyo, could be established by an international treaty or a military proclamation. It is reported
that the Bush Administration is considering this as a possibility for post-war Iraq. 119 Some of the
problems with such a court involve not only cost but the element of victor’s justice which
detracts from the legitimacy of the Court. There is also the fear that such a court would not have
116

Leila Sadat, What Would U.S. Do With Saddam?, March 23, 2003, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, at B1.

117

Jess Bravin, Tribunal in Africa May Serve as Model for Trial of Hussein, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
February 12, 2003 at B1.

118

See generally, Diane F. Orentlicher, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects, 13 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing a conference between the top leadership of the tribunals and the lessons that can
be learned from the experience of the ICTY and ICTR).
119

Sadat, supra note ___ at ___.

26

the support of the international community as a whole, but would merely be run by a “coalition
of the willing.”120
2.

The International Criminal Court

A second option would be to try Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime in the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). In 1998, representatives of more that 160 countries met to
create an International Criminal Court in which war criminals could be brought to justice. The
result of the conference was a treaty, known as the “Rome Statute,” which created the ICC. The
United States signed the treaty on December 31, 2000. At the time, President Clinton
acknowledged that the treaty was fundamentally flawed, but believed that the United States
could play a more active role in its development if it signed the treaty nevertheless.121
On May 6, 2002, John R. Bolton, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security sent a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stating that the United
States does not intend to become a party to the treaty and that it has no legal obligations arising
from its signature on December 31, 2000.122 Despite the United States’ purported “unsigning” of
the treaty, as of April 11, 2002, the number of countries who ratified the treaty surpassed 60,
which was the amount needed for the ICC to be entered into force.123 Iraq has not ratified the
ICC or accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.

120

Id.

121

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF WAR CRIMES ISSUES, FACT SHEET: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, May 6, 2002, http://www/state.gov/s/wci/rls/fs/2002 last visited November 20, 2002. While the problems
with the ICC are beyond the scope of this article, some of the concerns of the United States were jurisdiction over
nationals of a non-party, the definition of the crime of aggression, and the possibility of a politically motivated
prosecutor. Id.
122

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, PRESS STATEMENT, RICHARD BOUCHER, SPOKESMAN, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, May 6, 2002, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002,
last visited November 20, 2002.
123

Id.

27

Due to the fact both the United States and Iraq are not parties to the ICC, the only
mechanism that could be used to bring a case against Hussein and his regime is a referral from
the Security Council under Article 13 of the Rome Statute.124 As discussed above, it is unlikely
that the Security Council would agree to such measures in light of Security Council resistance to
the U.S. war against Iraq. Moreover, it is unlikely that the United States would even seek such a
referral, due to the Bush Administration’s clear opposition to the ICC. 125 Nor does it seem likely
that the United States would work towards developing a less problematic ICC while the Bush
Administration is in power.
3.

Hybrid Courts: The Special Court of Iraq

The third and most probable option for prosecution is the creation hybrid court modeled
after the Special Court of Sierra Leone. This option is also favored by the Bush Administration
and U.S. officials have stated that the Special Court of Sierra Leone offers a model that could be
used to try Hussein and his associates.126
There are considerable advantages to creating a court modeled after the Special Court of
Sierra Leone. For one, the prosecution will have both international and domestic elements as it
will be conducted by three judges appointed by the Iraqi government as well as has five judges
named by the Secretary General of the United Nations. The judges, not a jury, rule on guilt and
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impose sentences.127 Another benefit of such a court is that it sits where the crimes took place.
If the court were to sit in Kurdistan, for example, witnesses and evidence would be nearby and
the local population would be able to attend trials. Like the Sierra Leone court, the Iraqi court
could also employ locals as lawyers and support staff. The location of the court and the
involvement of local Kurds would be an important step in the development of a new system of
justice in Iraq.
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court of Sierra Leone has a strict budget which
is controlled by the United States, a three-year time frame and a limited scope, as only those with
the greatest responsibility for the atrocities are tried.128 A court created for Iraq could also follow
these strictures.
The Sierra Leone type court is not without its critics, however. David Scheffer, the
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues under the Clinton Administration believes that there
is a benefit to getting the top leadership out of Iraq and not having them percolating in Iraqi
detention centers staffed by Americans.129 Scheffer believes that it would be disruptive to
democracy building to have the “hard-line element still kicking around in Iraq.”130 Other
commentators have stated that it will be difficult to convince the Iraqis to agree to any kind of
international court as the death penalty will not be imposed, and that Iraq should try these crimes
in its own national courts without U.S. intervention.131 Overall, the benefits of a Sierra Leone
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type court clearly outweigh the burdens and this type of court is the best available option for
prosecuting the higher level members of the Iraqi regime.
4.

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

For the lower-level government officials who participated in the atrocities, a truth and
reconciliation commission is the most feasible option. Truth commissions have been
“enthusiastically adopted internationally because they promote national renewal and create more
inclusive national societies after state repression and violence.”132 The centerpiece of a truth
commission is the testimony of individuals as to their suffering. 133 Truth commissions serve two
important goals, as they allow victims the opportunity to tell their story and establish a recording
of the past, while at the same time serving to re-establish a national community.134 In a post-war
Iraq, it will be necessary to achieve both of these goals.
An Iraqi truth commission could be modeled on the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which was used to produce a comprehensive history of
human rights violations under apartheid between 1960 and 1994.135 While the hearings were
victim centered rather than focused on the perpetrators, the perpetrators were offered the
possibility of amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of their participation in the atrocities.
A truth and reconciliation commission is not without downsides, however. For one, as
learned through the South African experience, it is impossible for all victims to get their stories
told, so some are left out of the process.136 In addition, victims often feel “re-victimized” by the

132

MICHAEL HUMPHREY, THE POLITICS OF ATROCITY AND RECONCILIATION, FROM TERROR TO TRAUMA 106

(2002).
133

Id.

134

Id. at 108.

135

Id. at 109.

30

process, when listening to perpetrators again recount the humiliating details of their crimes in
exchange for amnesty. 137 Moreover, a truth commission does not guarantee that atrocities will
be prevented in the future. 138 Despite these downsides, however, a truth and reconciliation
commission is the most practical vehicle for addressing the violations of lower-level government
officials.
B.

Domestic Prosecution Options

In addition to international prosecution options, there are also domestic prosecution
options. As stated above, there is an argument that prosecution for the use of chemical weapons
take place in Iraq once the new government and legal system is formed. This is not a realistic
option, however, as it may take a considerable amount of time before a legal infrastructure is in
place. In addition, there are downsides to a prosecution run solely by Iraq, as it may be viewed
as illegitimate, politically motivated and self-serving. Moreover, the new leadership in Iraq may
simply not want to prosecute the former regime.
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime can also be prosecuted in any country that has
universal jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Universal
jurisdiction is the authority of domestic courts to prosecute certain crimes, regardless of where
the offense occurred, the nationality of the perpetrator, or the nationality of the victim.139
Belgium has a broad universal jurisdictions statute which has resulted in a flood of cases being
filed there.140 The laws of the United States, on the other hand, only provide for universal
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jurisdiction over certain terrorist offenses and torture, but not over war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide. 141 Thus, the United States laws are woefully inadequate to cover the
use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iran, as it would be difficult to construe such
offenses as torture or international terrorism.
The United States chemical weapons laws are also inadequate to provide for jurisdiction
in the United States courts. While there is a US statute which address the use of chemical
weapons, it only applies to chemical weapons used against U.S. nationals. The statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332a, provides that any person who, "without lawful authority," uses or threatens, attempts,
or conspires to use a weapon of mass destruction, including any biological agent, toxin, or vector,
against a national of the United States shall be punished, whether such national is within the
United States or not. Section 2332c of that Title similarly punishes any person who, "without
lawful authority," uses, or attempts or conspires to use a chemical weapon against a national of
the United States while such national is outside or within the United States.142 Of course, these
sections would not apply to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds as they
are not United States nationals.
Even if prosecution in the United States courts was a viable option, there are several
factors which would make such a prosecution undesirable. For one, the prosecution of the Iraqi
regime should be a global effort towards the establishment of international order and security.
Further, a United States prosecution may be viewed as impartial and paternalistic. On balance,
in reviewing all of the available prosecution options, it appears that a court based on the Sierra
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Leone model would be the most efficient the top tier of the Iraqi regime and would achieve the
goals to be gained from an international prosecution. In addition, a truth and reconciliation
commission should be instituted for those lower level government officials who participated in
the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iran.
V.

The Case For Prosecution: Why Prosecuting Saddam Hussein is Imperative

Based on the above, there exists sufficient evidence to successfully try Hussein and his
regime for their use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds under existing international
law. There are a number of options for where the prosecution should take place. What is
missing, however, is the political will to prosecute. It is imperative for the international
community to unite in its prosecution efforts. Now is the time to go forward with a prosecution
against Hussein and his regime. On January 17, 2003, Human Rights Watch issued a press
release calling for the immediate arrest and prosecution of Chemical Ali who was visiting Syria,
and also scheduled to visit Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.143 Human Rights Watch noted that all
four countries have ratified the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide which generally require that the states parties take
affirmative acts to prevent and punish war crimes and genocide. 144
There are many reasons why prosecution is an absolute necessity. The first is a result of
Iraq’s political structure. There is no system of checks and balances in Iraq. 145 Citizens who
have been victimized by the state have no recourse because there are no independent institutions
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to hold top government officials accountable for the crimes that they have carried out.146 A
prosecution of Hussein and his regime by the world community would serve to put the political
power back in the hands of the people, and send a message to other brutal regimes that
repressiveness will not be tolerated--and accountability is required.
The second reason to prosecute is so that the United States can rectify the grave error it
made years ago when it turned a blind eye to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran and the
Kurds. The United States refused to take affirmative action against Iraq because Iran was
viewed as an enemy and it needed Iraq to win the war against Iran. This hands-off approach as
to Iraq is illustrated by a statement made by the State Department in 1988, that “the United States
does not interfere in internal affairs” clearly referring to the Iraqi Kurds.147 The policy of the
United States at the time was to appease Hussein because he appeared to be pro-Western. As
one commentator has so aptly summarized “the fog of war again obscured an act of
genocide.”148
Neither the Reagan administration nor the first Bush administration spoke out against
Hussein’s use of chemical weapons. In fact, the Reagan administration worked to kill a bill in
the Senate which would have placed severe sanctions against Iraq for its use of chemical
weapons.149 Likewise, when the first Bush administration took over the White House, Iraq
continued to be viewed as a potentially helpful ally, and Hussein was able to get another $1
billion in agricultural credits from the United States.150 Instead of punishing Iraq for the use of
chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds, Iraq was in essence being rewarded. It was only
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when Iraq invaded Kuwait that the political tide changed. Today, in 2003, the United States is
still contending with Hussein. There is incessant daily rhetoric that Hussein must be removed
from power. Ironically, the current Bush administration lists Hussein’s use of chemical weapons
as one of the reasons supporting removal. It goes without saying that the United States has acted
hypocritically with regard to Iraq.
Undeniably prosecution of Hussein for the use of chemical weapons should have
occurred years ago. Nevertheless, it is important for the United States prosecute Hussein now to
send a message that the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated by the United States and
the world. Further, the United States must adhere to a policy that no one who uses chemical
weapons (friend or foe) will go unpunished. The United States should not let anything
overshadow the protection of fundamental human rights.
Finally, prosecution would legitimize the rule of international law. So far, by failing to
take any action against Hussein and his community, the rule of international law has been left
weak and undermined. 151 There is considerable value to prosecution and it would put Hussein
and his crimes on a worldwide stage. A strong rule of international law would ensure global
security as the world moves further into the 21st century.
VII.

Conclusion

In sum, it is clear that a prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his regime is imperative and
that the time has come to take steps in this direction. There is overwhelming evidence as well as
laws already on the books under which to prosecute Hussein and his regime for the use of
chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. The prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his
regime, will be the step in the right direction towards achieving the “freedom from fear” which
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has eluded the United States and the world for the past 60 years. Perhaps we may finally be the
“good society” that is able to confront without fear the “schemes of world domination and
foreign revolutions” as President Roosevelt had hoped back in 1941. 152
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